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ABSTRACT
The US federal government has recently made a substantial investment to enhance the US health information technology
(IT) infrastructure. Previous literature on the impact of IT on ﬁrm performance across multiple industries has emphasized
the importance of a process of co-invention whereby organizations develop complementary practices to achieve greater
beneﬁt from their IT investments. In health care, employment of physicians by hospitals can confer greater administrative
control to hospitals over physicians’ actions and resources and thus enable the implementation of new technology and
initiatives aimed at maximizing beneﬁt from use of the technology. In this study, I tested for the relationship between
hospital employment of physicians and hospitals’ propensity to use health IT. I used state laws that prohibit hospital
employment of physicians as an instrument to account for the endogenous relationship with hospital IT use. Hospital
employment of physicians is associated with signiﬁcant increases in the probability of hospital health IT use. Therefore,
subsidization of health IT among hospitals not employing physicians may be less efﬁcient. Furthermore, state laws
prohibiting hospitals from employing physicians may inhibit adoption of health IT, thus working against policy initiatives
aimed at promoting use of the technology. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the US Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which appropriates funds to
promote the adoption and use of health information technology (IT). The Medicare and Medicaid insurance
programs are distributing these funds as rewards to providers for meeting various criteria for implementation
and use of health IT with the goal of improving quality and cost-efﬁciency of care (Blumenthal and Tavenner,
2010). A prominent health IT application emphasized by the program is the computerized provider order entry
(CPOE). CPOE helps providers to create and manage orders for patients’ services and medication and has been
promoted as an important component in improving patient safety (I.O.M, 2001). In theory, CPOE can reduce
errors due to illegible handwriting, and with the aid of alerts, decision support, and detailed clinical information
about a patient contained in an electronic medical record (EMR), it can help avoid adverse events from drug–
drug interactions and known drug allergies. It can also enable faster delivery times to the pharmacy and may be
less subject to errors caused by similar drug names and incorrect drug choices (Koppel et al., 2005).
This study contributes evidence regarding the relationship between vertical integration in healthcare and
hospital use of clinical IT applications. It enhances our understanding of the organizational determinants of
health IT adoption. Various cross-sectional and longitudinal studies have identiﬁed determinants of health IT
adoption, including system afﬁliation, size, urban location, multihospital system membership, network effects,
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and not-for-proﬁt ownership (Cutler et al., 2005; Kazley and Ozcan, 2007; McCullough, 2008; Miller and
Tucker, 2009). Previous research on the relationship between IT and ﬁrm size and ﬁrm boundaries in other
industries has found that increases in IT capital are associated with a decline in average ﬁrm size, consistent
with case analyses and theoretical arguments, suggesting that IT lowers the costs of coordinating externally
with suppliers, thus leading to less vertical integration (Brynjolfsson et al., 1994; Hitt, 1999). However,
evidence from the introduction of on-board computers in the trucking industry indicates that this technology,
serving as a monitoring device in that context, altered incentives related to ownership of trucks and thereby
induced more vertical integration in that industry (Baker and Hubbard, 2004). Thus, ﬁndings in non-healthcare
industries do not show a consistent relationship between IT and ﬁrm boundaries. In the healthcare context,
McCullough and Snir (2010) found evidence of a positive relationship between exclusive hospital–physician
afﬁliations and hospital use of IT applications that enhance monitoring of physician activities, including
utilization review software and clinical data repositories.
Hospital–physician organizational arrangements come in various forms. The traditional medical staff model,
by far the most common arrangement before the managed care era, involves only the granting of admitting
privileges by a hospital to its physicians without direct ﬁnancial ties between the two. During the managed care
era, many hospitals entered into various arrangements with physicians, including at one extreme, direct
employment of physicians. Although the era of tight managed care has passed, hospitals still face pressures
from payers via negotiated payment rates, per diem or case rate payments, and Medicare’s prospective payment
system to control costs. Thus, coordination with physicians continues to be a concern for hospitals. Cuellar and
Gertler (2006) provided a detailed discussion of other organizational arrangements between hospitals and
physicians aside from employment.
In this study, I restrict the deﬁnition of hospital–physician integration to hospital employment of physicians
and examine if this organizational form displays signiﬁcantly different health IT adoption patterns relative to
other looser hospital–physician afﬁliations. This restricted deﬁnition is warranted because employment is
the most common form of integration between hospitals and physicians reported in the American Hospital
Association (AHA) survey and has risen during the past decade while other forms have declined (Gaynor, 2011).
This evidence is corroborated by recent independent research revealing that hospital employment of physicians,
both specialists and primary care, is increasing nationwide (Casalino et al., 2008; O’Malley et al., 2011). Because
the trend toward physician employment by hospitals coincides with increasing interest in stimulating health IT
use, understanding any interactions between these two hospital strategies will inform both policies intended to
inﬂuence health IT adoption and policies focused on hospital–physician relations, including antitrust regulation
and initiatives fostering the development of Accountable Care Organizations.
1.1. Conceptual model
Because much beneﬁt from health IT follows from reduced costs of communicating and managing patient
information across multiple settings and over different episodes of care (Hillestad et al., 2005), providers’
use of, or failure to use, the technology imposes an externality on other providers and the patients they serve
(Miller and Tucker, 2009). Since the costs and beneﬁts of investment in information systems do not accrue
to a single provider, a public goods problem arises in which each agent has inadequate incentives to privately
invest in the necessary technology.
Although many factors other than the coordination of information system investments contribute to hospital
and physician decisions about whether to integrate, those hospitals that do employ their medical staff can more
readily internalize the externality stemming from availability of patient data in electronic form. Without an
exclusive hospital–physician afﬁliation, building necessary interfaces between inpatient and ambulatory
information systems can be problematic because of the threat of regulatory actions under the federal Stark
and antikickback laws prohibiting hospitals from offering ﬁnancial incentives to independent physicians in
return for referrals. Even with amendments to these laws in 2006 that were designed to facilitate hospital
ﬁnancing of IT implementation in physician practices, independent physicians must still contribute a substantial
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portion of the funds required for the technology (Grossman and Cohen, 2008). Hospitals that own physician
practices face no such legal barriers to ﬁnancing information systems that exchange patient data between
settings of care, thus allowing them to capture greater beneﬁt from these investments.
Furthermore, hospital employment of physicians confers advantages in the face of uncertainty, such as potential
future changes in payment systems (e.g. movement by payers to impose greater risk-bearing or pay-for-performance
on providers). Integration does this by centralizing control of hospital resources, including the medical staff and
associated practice assets, under the authority of hospital administrators. Transaction cost economics, which I
adopt as the framework for understanding the relative performance of physician employment versus looser
arrangements, emphasizes advantages of authority compared with coordination among looser afﬁliates. These
advantages ﬂow from the ability of managers to reallocate resources in the face of uncertainty without the necessity
of negotiating (Williamson, 1975; Menard, 2005). In the context of this study, we may understand hospital
implementation of health IT as an adaptive response to the hospital’s environment that requires cooperation from
physicians. Integration between hospitals and physicians confers greater control to hospitals over physicians’
actions and resources and thus enables a more beneﬁcial implementation of the new technology.
I also draw on Jeffrey Harris’ (1977) model of the internal organization of hospitals. Because of the
uncertainty surrounding human disease processes, Harris highlights the importance to hospitals of rapid
adaptation to “changing circumstances and new information” while determining the appropriate short-term
allocation of resources. In theory, health IT can improve information management and communication in
hospitals, thus enabling more efﬁcient use of resources. These considerations contribute to hospital demand
for health IT. However, as Harris points out, a tension exists between physicians, who serve as their patients’
agents in procuring hospital resources, and hospital administrators, who must supply the necessary inputs for
care without carrying too much excess capacity. This tension contributes to hospital administrators’ desire
for greater control over physician actions, thus leading to alignment strategies, such as directly employing
physicians. Conditions for physician participation include compensation that meets or exceeds a minimum
threshold determined by physician risk preferences and the proﬁtability of owning an independent practice.
Furthermore, IT enhances the capability of hospitals to monitor the actions of afﬁliated physicians and
structure incentives accordingly (McCullough and Snir, 2010). As noted by Masten (1988), certain legal
requirements, such as employer liability for the actions of employees, enhance incentives to monitor employee
activities more carefully relative to independent contractors’ activities. When hospitals employ physicians, they
assume malpractice liability that they would not otherwise have to bear for physicians (Cebul et al., 2008). This
liability may motivate use of IT for monitoring purposes within tightly integrated health systems relative to
hospitals more loosely afﬁliated with their medical staffs.
Alternatively, hospital use of health IT can substitute for direct employment of physicians by allowing
hospitals to attract independent physicians through conveniences associated with health IT, such as ready
access to inpatient information through physician internet portals or through a reputation effect as a sign of
prestige. Because the relationship between physician employment and health IT may involve both complemen-
tarity and substitutability, empirical research can illuminate the relative magnitudes of these effects. In this
study, I test for a relationship between hospital employment of physicians and the probability that hospitals
adopt two prominent health IT applications—EMR and CPOE.
2. DATA AND METHODS
2.1. Data sources
The Health Information Management Systems Society (HIMSS) Analytics database for 2008 provides informa-
tion on hospital use of health IT applications for more than 4800 nonfederal acute care hospitals in the USA—a
near census of such hospitals. Included in the database are variables indicating hospital use of enterprise-wide
EMR and CPOE. Respondents to this survey report if they have an operational system or not. The AHA annual
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survey for 2008 provides information on hospital characteristics, including employment of physicians, for
more than 6000 hospitals, including 4678 nonfederal general hospitals. I merged the HIMSS Analytics
database with the AHA data using various hospital identiﬁers common to both data sets, including the
hospitals’Medicare provider numbers, names, and addresses. After merging these data sets, the sample consists
of 4502 nonfederal general hospitals observed in 2008. The 2008 Area Resource File provides data on county-
level demographics.
For part of the analysis, I used data regarding state corporate practice of medicine (CPM) laws. The
CPM doctrine, which has been deﬁned primarily through case law interpretations of state medical practice acts,
prohibits unlicensed entities (nonphysicians) from employing medical doctors (Kim, 2007). In some states, this
doctrine has been extended to prohibit the employment of physicians by hospitals. Some states only prohibit
for-proﬁt hospitals. Previous research substantiates the premise that these laws present a binding constraint
for many hospitals subject to them. A 1991 Department of Health and Human Services study involving a
random sample survey of hospital administrators found that the laws impose “legal, recruitment or administra-
tive costs,” and “make it more difﬁcult to staff medical services” (Yessian et al., 1991). A recent analysis of
California’s CPM doctrine notes that, despite availability of alternative integrated arrangements between
hospitals and physicians, “the complexity and costs of such efforts may preclude smaller, ﬁnancially weaker,
and rural hospitals from pursuing them (Draper et al., 2009).”
A research assistant did comprehensive searches of state and federal statutes and case law and consulted
state medical societies and previous CPM studies to identify states that apply the doctrine to hospital employment
of physicians. Figure 1 shows states that were found to enforce CPM against hospital employment of physicians
in two groups: (1) those restricting both not-for-proﬁt and for-proﬁt hospitals and (2) those restricting only
for-proﬁts. All other states were not found to have a CPM law that prohibits hospital employment of
physicians. Within those states that apply the CPM doctrine to not-for-proﬁt hospitals, there are exceptions
for particular classes of hospitals (Draper et al., 2009). The exceptions to CPM in those states that apply
the law to hospitals are described in an appendix. From these data, I constructed a hospital-level indicator
for binding CPM restrictions against employing physicians. To the extent that exempt hospitals are
identiﬁable with the AHA survey (e.g. because of nonproﬁt or government ownership or teaching status
in some states), the indicator variable for CPM takes into account the various exceptions within those
states that apply the restriction.
Table I provides summary statistics for the variables used in the estimations described. I report results and
summary statistics only for the sample with nonmissing data. These summary statistics are also presented with
Figure 1. States that have a corporate practice of medicine statute or case law prohibiting some hospitals from employing physicians
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stratiﬁcation according to whether the hospital is bound by corporate practice of medicine restrictions and
P values from t-tests of differences in means. In the case of for-proﬁt status and teaching status, differences
between hospitals bound by the law and those not bound follow obviously from differential application of
the law between for-proﬁts and nonproﬁts and academic versus nonacademic hospitals in some states. Because
there are several signiﬁcant differences in observed characteristics between hospitals bound by the law and
Table I. Descriptive statistics for general hospitals in 2008 stratiﬁed by state laws restricting the corporate practice of
medicine
All
hospitals
(N= 3493)
Bound by state restrictions
on physician employment
(N = 616)
Not bound by state restrictions
on physician employment
(N= 2877)
Variable Mean Mean Mean P value from t-test
of difference in
means
Dependent variables
CPOE 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.002
EMR 0.48 0.37 0.51 <0.001
Comparison technologies
Business intelligence 0.27 0.32 0.26 0.003
Data warehousing 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.34
Financial modeling 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.49
Organizational arrangement
with physicians
Employs physicians
(integrated salary model)
0.36 0.15 0.40 <0.001
Hospital characteristics
Member of the council of
teaching hospitals
0.072 0.005 0.09 <0.001
Government owned
(nonfederal)
0.24 0.23 0.25 0.35
Nonproﬁt ownership 0.64 0.53 0.66 <0.001
For proﬁt ownership 0.12 0.24 0.09 <0.001
Total admissions 8,154 7,424 8,310 0.0163
Member of a multihospital
healthcare system
0.55 0.61 0.53 <0.001
Percent Medicare discharges 0.49 0.48 0.50 <0.001
Percent Medicaid discharges 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.09
Geographic and market
characteristics
Metropolitan CBSA 0.55 0.66 0.52 <0.001
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index
by HRR for total admissions
3,263 2,860 3,350 <0.001
Median household income in
county
$48,252 $48,842 $48,126 0.22
Medicare managed care
penetration in the county
0.18 0.19 0.17 0.003
Located in a state with
corporate practice of medicine
restrictions
0.28 1 0.13 <0.001
Other state regulations
Electronic discovery laws
(ca. 2007)
0.32 0.50 0.29 <0.001
Privacy protection laws
(ca. 2002)
0.49 0.77 0.43 <0.001
Instrument
Bound by law prohibiting
hospital employment of
physicians
0.18 1 0
HRR, hospital referral region
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those not bound by the law, in the regression analyses, I control for a rich set of observed hospital character-
istics on the assumption the law is validly excluded as a predictor of health IT use conditional on the observed
hospital characteristics.
In 2008, thirty-ﬁve percent of the sample reported having an employment arrangement with their physicians.
As expected, a substantially larger proportion of hospitals that are not bound by CPM laws report employment
of physicians. Although the laws technically prohibit integration as deﬁned in this article, they imperfectly
(but strongly) predict nonintegration due to some exempt hospitals that cannot be identiﬁed with the available
data, possible variation in enforcement practices, and reporting error regarding integration in the survey. The
problem of reporting error is mitigated by the instrumental variable strategy used in this study.
For comparison, I also examined hospital use of several administrative IT applications, including business
intelligence software, ﬁnancial modeling, and ﬁnancial data warehousing. These computer-based applications
are designed to provide performance data for business and ﬁnancial measures to support management decision
making. They were in use by proportions of hospitals similar to those using the clinical applications in
this study. By ruling out a strong association between these applications and hospital–physician integration,
I established further evidence that the effect of integration on health IT is due to a complementary relationship
between physician employment and the technology as described in my conceptual model and not due to
another mechanism.
Relevant hospital characteristics are included as control variables. In particular, membership in the council
of teaching hospitals, for-proﬁt, not-for-proﬁt, and government ownership and the proportion of patients
insured by government payers (Medicare and Medicaid) are included in the estimates. As a measure of the
managed care environment faced by hospitals, the Medicare managed care penetration rate is also included.
Linear splines for total admissions are included as a measure of hospital size. To improve the ﬁt of the models,
I tested for differences in the coefﬁcients of spline segments and combined those that were not found to be
signiﬁcantly different from one another. This procedure resulted in two segments for total admissions in the
CPOE estimation, four in the EMR estimation, and four in the comparison technology regressions. Competition
among hospitals is measured using the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for which higher values indicate
more concentrated markets. For this study, a market is a hospital referral region (HRR), deﬁned by the
Dartmouth Atlas as a regional market for tertiary care based around hospitals that provide major cardiovascular
procedures and neurosurgery (Dartmouth Medical, 1998).
2.2. Empirical model
I estimated the probability that a hospital has a particular health IT application (EMR and in a separate
regression, CPOE) cross sectionally as a function of hospital–physician integration using probit. However,
because hospitals make decisions about health IT and physician employment with consideration for the same
sets of circumstances, unobserved hospital characteristics can contribute to bias in estimating the relationship
between these two variables. For example, higher costs of maintaining an independent physician practice in
some markets may lead to substantially more hospital-based employment. Previous research using consulting
reports, surveys, and case studies documents rising overhead costs in independent practice as contributing to
more physicians accepting hospital employment in recent years (Burns and Muller, 2008). These costs of
maintaining independent physician practices will be correlated with local costs of adopting health IT, such
as labor costs for professionals needed to support use of the new technology. These costs, in turn, reduce
hospital propensity to adopt health IT even while an employed physician staff reduces other organizational
impediments to adoption. Thus, the correlation between unobserved physician practice costs and unobserved
labor costs for IT will bias coefﬁcient estimates toward zero in a single equation estimation of the relationship
between hospital–physician integration and hospital propensity to use health IT.
To mitigate bias from the endogeneity of hospital–physician integration, I used information about whether
hospitals are prohibited by state laws from directly employing physicians as an instrumental variable in a
bivariate probit regression. Because these state laws have remained static during the period over which EMR
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and CPOE have diffused, I estimated a single period cross-sectional regression for 2008—the latest year for
which data were available, and also the year during which there is the greatest variation in hospital use of
the technology and hospital employment of physicians so far. Having substantial variation in these two hospital
characteristics is, of course, necessary for estimating the relationship of interest.
The model is presented in the following equations:
Th ¼ b0 þ b1Ih þ b2HOSPITALh þ b3MARKETh þ eT
Th ¼ 1 Th > 0ð Þ (1)
Ih ¼ θ0 þ θ1RESTRICTIONSh þ θ2HOSPITALh þ θ3MARKETh þ eI
Ih ¼ 1 Ih > 0ð Þ (2)
Hospital h’s adoption of health IT (T) is a function of an unobserved latent index variable (T*), which
represents hospital h’s propensity to adopt health IT. T* in turn is a linear function of integration with
physicians (I)—a dichotomous variable—a vector of hospital characteristics (HOSPITAL) and a vector of
hospital market characteristics (MARKET). Integration status is treated as endogenous, whereas all other
hospital and market characteristics are regarded as exogenous. Integration status (I) is modeled as a function
of state laws prohibiting physician employment (RESTRICTIONS) as well as vectors of hospital characteristics
(HOSPITAL) and hospital market characteristics (MARKET). This strategy produces consistent estimates of
the coefﬁcient on hospital employment of physicians in Equation (1) from which I calculate the incremental
effect of hospital–physician integration on the probability of health IT adoption. The key identifying assump-
tions in terms of this model are that RESTRICTIONS affects integration, and only inﬂuences T (with adjustment
for other observed variables) through its effect on I and is therefore uncorrelated with eT. The error terms in the
two latent index functions, eT and eI, are modeled as having a bivariate normal distribution. Because of the cru-
cial role of state-level policies in the identiﬁcation strategy, all regressions allow for correlation in the error
components among hospitals in the same state.
3. RESULTS
Probit estimates of the effect of physician employment on hospital use of health IT yield insigniﬁcant positive
results. Table II displays the average marginal effects from the probit estimates for EMR and CPOE. Signiﬁcant
predictors of health IT use include teaching status, total admissions, and metropolitan location. For-proﬁt status
has a signiﬁcant negative relationship with both forms of health IT relative to private nonproﬁt hospitals,
whereas government ownership has a signiﬁcant negative relationship only for EMRs relative to private
nonproﬁts. Median household income has a signiﬁcant positive relationship with CPOE, but not with
EMR systems.
Furthermore, I estimated the probability of health IT use as a function of integration status, other hospital
characteristics, and market/county characteristics using recursive bivariate probit with state corporate practice
of medicine laws as an instrument for hospital–physician integration. Bhattacharya et al. (2006) document
evidence on the advantages of recursive bivariate probit relative to other instrumental variables (IV) strategies
for estimating treatment effects when both outcome and treatment variables are dichotomous.
Table III reports average marginal effects from the estimate of the probability of hospital–physician
integration (the ﬁrst stage equation of the bivariate probit regression). Consistent with expectations, binding
CPM laws produce a signiﬁcant 24 percentage point decline in the probability of employing physicians. Other
results from estimating the probability of hospital–physician integration indicate that for-proﬁt hospitals are
signiﬁcantly less likely to employ physicians than nonproﬁts. Operating in a more concentrated market is
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associated with a higher probability of employing physicians. Among larger hospitals, total admissions are
positively associated with the probability of integration.
Table IV reports average marginal effects on the probability of health IT use (@Φ(T)/@x) from the health IT
bivariate probit regressions. Standard errors for the average marginal effect estimates from these regressions
were calculated using the delta method. The average marginal effects indicate a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between physician employment and the use of both EMR and CPOE. Here, I found that integration is
associated with a 24 percentage point increase in the probability of CPOE use and a thirty-nine percentage point
increase in the probability of EMR use. Teaching status and metropolitan location remain signiﬁcant positive
predictors of both health IT applications. Total patient admissions, within some ranges, is signiﬁcantly and
positively associated with the probability of both forms of health IT. Although the marginal effect of
for-proﬁt status remains a signiﬁcant negative predictor of the probability of EMR use, it is not statistically
signiﬁcant in the CPOE regression, contrary to the univariate probit results. It does, however, have a negative
direct effect as with univariate probit. These results suggest that much of the negative effect of for-proﬁt status
on CPOE use comes indirectly through its negative effect on integration.
A test of the strength of the excluded instrument produces a chi-square test statistic of 24, indicating a
reasonably strong instrument (Table IV). The other requirement that an instrument must satisfy to be valid is
an exclusion restriction—in this case, CPM laws should only inﬂuence the probability of health IT adoption
through hospital–physician integration and not through any unobserved variable. Because the CPM laws
predate the adoption of modern information systems and have remained static with respect to hospitals ever
since, these laws (adjusted for observed hospital characteristics) are plausibly uncorrelated with EMR and
CPOE adoption except through their effect on hospital–physician integration. Furthermore, I ﬁnd evidence that
Table II. Average marginal effects from naive probit estimation of CPOE and EMR use as a function of integration
status in 2008
Variables
EMR CPOE
@Φ(T)/@XEMR @Φ(T)/@XCPOE
Endogenous variable
Integrated salary model 0.014 (0.020) 0.014 (0.019)
Hospital characteristics
Member of the council of teaching hospitals 0.123*** (0.045) 0.122*** (0.035)
For proﬁt 0.325*** (0.047) 0.055** (0.028)
Government owned (nonfederal) 0.060** (0.026) 0.005 (0.023)
Member of a healthcare system 0.037* (0.023) 0.026 (0.017)
Percent Medicare discharges 0.052 (0.090) 0.157** (0.065)
Percent Medicaid discharges 0.08 (0.14) 0.12 (0.12)
Total admissions (1000) splines
<1.34 0.101*** (0.029)
>1.34 0.00397*** (0.00083)
<0.43 0.36* (0.20)
0.43–2.23 0.124*** (0.020)
2.23–8.63 0.0125*** (0.0049)
>8.63 0.0005 (0.0015)
Geographic and market characteristics
Metropolitan or division CBSA 0.044* (0.024) 0.071*** (0.017)
Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index (rescaled by 1000) by HRR 0.009 (0.010) 0.003 (0.011)
Median household income in county (in $10,000) 0.0085 (0.011) 0.0202** (0.0083)
Medicare managed care penetration in county 0.036 (0.093) 0.131* (0.069)
N 3493 3493
Standard errors calculated by the delta method are reported in parentheses. Estimates allow for correlation in the error terms within states.
HRR, hospital referral region.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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employment of physicians is endogenous with respect to hospital health IT use via a Wald test of the hypothesis
that rho = 0 in both health IT bivariate probit regressions (Table IV). This test indicates that there is substantial
correlation between hospital health IT use and employment of physicians after observed factors have been
accounted for. Thus, the coefﬁcient estimate for integration in a single equation probit model will be inconsis-
tent, and the use of an instrumental variables strategy is warranted.
3.1. Robustness
I tested the effect of integration on other hospital administrative IT applications for which, a priori, we would
not expect a relationship with hospital–physician integration. In particular, if aligning physicians with the
implementation of hospital health IT and improving communication of patient data between hospitals and
physician practices are reasons why greater health IT adoption is attributable to physician employment, then
there should be no relationship between employment of physicians and other IT applications that do not share
these properties. I estimated the effect of integration on the probability that hospitals use administrative IT
applications, including business intelligence applications, ﬁnancial modeling software, and ﬁnancial data
warehousing systems. All of these applications are intended to provide data analysis on ﬁrm performance to
hospital administrative decision makers. Both the probit results (Table V) and the bivariate probit results
(Table VI) indicate no signiﬁcant relationship between hospital–physician integration and these applications.
Table III. Average marginal effects on the marginal probability of hospital–physician integration (the ﬁrst stage) from
recursive bivariate probit estimation of CPOE and EMR probabilities using state corporate practice of medicine laws as an
instrument for employment of medical staff in 2008
Variables
Hospital–physician integration
@Φ(I)/@XEMR @Φ(I)/@XCPOE
Hospital characteristics
Member of the council of teaching hospitals 0.019 (0.055) 0.021 (0.053)
For proﬁt 0.150*** (0.034) 0.149*** (0.034)
Government owned (nonfederal) 0.039* (0.022) 0.036(0.023)
Member of a healthcare system 0.0057 (0.021) 0.006(0.021)
Percent Medicare discharges 0.016 (0.076) 0.023 (0.078)
Percent Medicaid discharges 0.082 (0.093) 0.097 (0.093)
Total admissions (1000) splines
<1.34 0.066** (0.028)
>1.34 0.0062*** (0.0015)
<0.43 0.24** (0.11)
0.43–2.23 0.027* (0.015)
2.23–8.63 0.0078* (0.0043)
>8.63 0.0062*** (0.0019)
Geographic and market characteristics
Metropolitan or division CBSA 0.022 (0.025) 0.019 (0.023)
Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index (rescaled by 1000) by HRR 0.0018 (0.013) 0.002 (0.013)
Median household income in county (in $10,000) 0.0133 (0.0091) 0.0142 (0.0092)
Medicare managed care penetration in county 0.11 (0.31) 0.05 (0.11)
Instrumental variable
Hospital bound by laws prohibiting physician employment 0.241*** (0.048) 0.243*** (0.047)
Chi-square test of strength of instrument 23.67 24.44
P value from chi-square test 0.000 0.000
N 3493 3493
Standard errors calculated by the delta method are reported in parentheses. Estimates allow for correlation in the error terms within states.
HRR, hospital referral region.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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The null results of this falsiﬁcation exercise provide some reassurance that results from the main health IT
analysis constitute evidence in favor of the hypothesized relationship between physician employment and
health IT.
A critical assumption for the identiﬁcation of hospital–physician integration’s effect on health IT adoption is
that CPM laws only affect health IT adoption through physician employment by hospitals. I examine the
robustness of the ﬁndings to this assumption by testing the bivariate probit models without any covariates.
If association between the instrument and the unobserved variables is similar to the association between the
instrument and the observed variables, then obtaining similar results without any covariates suggests the
main ﬁndings are not biased by unobserved factors. In fact, I ﬁnd almost no change in the effect of
hospital–physician integration (columns 4 and 5 of Table VII) when all covariates are excluded (although,
unsurprisingly, the estimates with covariates are more precise). Although this is reassuring, the possibility
always remains that unobserved cultural and institutional factors may inﬂuence both the preservation of
CPM laws and adoption of health IT, thus biasing the IV estimates. Therefore, I conducted several additional
robustness tests.
Because the identiﬁcation strategy depends on cross-sectional variation in state CPM regulations, I am
unable to estimate models with state ﬁxed effects. Alternatively, I estimated separate models that include
indicators for state electronic discovery laws and privacy protection laws in place during 2008 as covariates.
Table IV. Average marginal effects on probability of health IT use from recursive bivariate probit estimation of CPOE
and EMR probabilities using state corporate practice of medicine laws as an instrument for employment of medical staff
in 2008
Variables
EMR CPOE
@Φ Tð Þ
@X
@Φ Tð Þ
@X
Endogenous variable
Integrated salary model 0.391*** (0.030) 0.241*** (0.053)
Hospital characteristics
Member of the council of teaching hospitals 0.053* (0.032) 0.093*** (0.031)
For proﬁt 0.188*** (0.039) 0.019 (0.033)
Government owned (nonfederal) 0.025 (0.022) 0.0050 (0.022)
Member of a healthcare system 0.034** (0.017) 0.028 (0.016)
Percent Medicare discharges 0.053 (0.079) 0.156** (0.066)
Percent Medicaid discharges 0.015 (0.10) 0.08 (0.12)
Total admissions (1000) splines
<1.34 0.107*** (0.027)
>1.34 0.0022** (0.0011)
<0.43 0.35** (0.16)
0.43–2.23 0.100*** (0.016)
2.23–8.63 0.0060 (0.0038)
>8.63 0.0022* (0.0013)
Geographic and market characteristics
Metropolitan or division CBSA 0.049*** (0.018) 0.074*** (0.015)
Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index (rescaled by 1000) by HRR 0.0014 (0.0073) 0.001 (0.010)
Median household income in county (in $10,000) 0.0102 (0.0075) 0.0212*** (0.0076)
Medicare managed care penetration in county 0.048 (0.065) 0.136** (0.064)
Tests
Chi-square test of instrument strength 23.67 24.44
rho 0.70 (0.09) 0.52 (0.12)
P value from test of rho = 0 0.0000 0.0003
N 3493 3493
Standard errors calculated by the delta method are reported in parentheses. Estimates allow for correlation in the error terms within states.
HRR, hospital referral region.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Miller and Tucker (2009, 2011a) have demonstrated that these two types of laws have signiﬁcant effects on
hospital adoption of EMR. Estimations that control for these other state regulations (in columns 6 and 7 of
Table VII) show slight increases in the effect of integration with no changes in statistical signiﬁcance.
Furthermore, I estimated a “placebo” version of the reduced form equation among only hospitals that do not
face CPM restrictions. Thirteen percent of hospitals that do not face CPM restrictions are located in CPM
enforcing states (Table I). Although the marginal effects are negative for both EMR and CPOE, they are not
signiﬁcantly so (last two columns of Table VII). The results of these tests provide some reassurance that
CPM laws are not correlated with unobserved variables within CPM enforcing states that may be driving the
main ﬁndings.
I also tested the IV model using an alternative instrument—the number of unafﬁliated hospitals in the same
market that employ physicians. With the alternative instrument, all analyses produce results nearly identical to
the main ﬁndings (results are available from the author upon request).
4. DISCUSSION
This study examines the relationship between hospital employment of physicians and hospital use of health
IT applications. Although a probit estimation of this relationship ﬁnds no signiﬁcant effect of physician
employment on the probability that hospitals use health IT, an instrumental variables analysis reveals a
signiﬁcant positive relationship between the two hospital strategies. These results suggest that unobserved
factors, such as local costs of running independent physician practices and costs of IT adoption, inﬂuence
hospitals’ actions for both types of acquisitions. Measurement error in the integration variable may also
Table V. Average marginal effects from naive probit estimation of nonclinical IT applications as a function of hospital
characteristics in 2008
Variables
Business intelligence Financial modeling Data warehousing
@Φ Tð Þ
@X
@Φ Tð Þ
@X
@Φ Tð Þ
@X
Endogenous variable
Integrated salary model 0.020 (0.020) 0.0062 (0.016) 0.015 (0.016)
Hospital characteristics
Member of the council of teaching hospitals 0.031 (0.032) 0.029 (0.036) 0.017 (0.031)
For proﬁt 0.076** (0.038) 0.015 (0.041) 0.063 (0.053)
Government owned (nonfederal) 0.056* (0.032) 0.041 (0.027) 0.056** (0.026)
Member of a healthcare system 0.088*** (0.025) 0.086*** (0.024) 0.080*** (0.024)
Percent Medicare discharges 0.091 (0.095) 0.124 (0.089) 0.165* (0.094)
Percent Medicaid discharges 0.01 (0.12) 0.00 (0.11) 0.05 (0.14)
Total admissions (1000) splines
<0.43 0.68*** (0.14) 0.34** (0.16) 0.22 (0.17)
0.43–12.8 0.0115*** (0.0030) 0.0117*** (0.0032) 0.0068*** (0.0025)
12.8–19 0.0108** (0.0052) 0.0039 (0.0057) 0.0013 (0.0056)
>19 0.0037*** (0.0012) 0.0009 (0.0017) 0.0013 (0.0016)
Geographic and market characteristics
Metropolitan or Division CBSA 0.058*** (0.017) 0.058** (0.026) 0.094*** (0.015)
Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index (rescaled by 1000) by HRR 0.011 (0.011) 0.006 (0.012) 0.002 (0.011)
Median household income in county (in $10,000) 0.0018 (0.0098) 0.0076 (0.0084) 0.0099 (0.0068)
Medicare managed care penetration in county 0.141* (0.076) 0.077 (0.083) 0.006 (0.065)
N 3493 3493 3493
Standard errors calculated by the delta method are reported in parentheses. Estimates allow for correlation in the hospital error terms within
states. HRR, hospital referral region.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
HOSPITAL–PHYSICIAN INTEGRATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 1225
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 22: 1215–1229 (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
contribute to a bias toward zero (as it always does when present) in the single equation estimates. Fortunately,
instrumental variables, uncorrelated with the measurement error, still produce consistent estimates in this
circumstance (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). Moreover, the ﬁndings provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis
of a complementary relationship between integration and health IT and suggest that hospitals with employed
physicians may perceive greater net beneﬁt from use of health IT compared with hospitals without employed
physicians. This supports the transaction cost interpretation of vertical integration in that integration confers
greater adaptability to the organization by lowering costs of coordinating with physicians to implement new
enterprise-wide technology. Further research is needed to understand more precisely how hospital employment
of physicians interacts with health IT to affect quality, outcomes, and costs of care.
A limitation regarding the generalizability of the IV results in this study should be noted. The effect of
physician employment on hospital health IT adoption is identiﬁed using variation in state laws that prohibit
hospitals from employing physicians. Therefore, we can only interpret the estimated impact of integration on
IT adoption as the average effect among those hospitals that are bound by the laws but would have otherwise
chosen to employ physicians rather than as the average effect of physician employment among all hospitals
nationwide. This is the local average treatment effect interpretation of an instrumental variables analysis
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Although incentive payments to hospitals, such as those through the Medicare and Medicaid Meaningful
Use programs, may reduce some monetary costs faced by hospitals in acquiring the technology, other organi-
zational costs may still inhibit its effective implementation by providers. Inability to capture some beneﬁts of
Table VI. Average marginal effects on probability of nonclinical IT applications from recursive bivariate probit estimation
using state corporate practice of medicine laws as an instrument for employment of medical staff in 2008
Dependent variables
Business intelligence Financial modeling Data warehousing
@Φ Tð Þ
@X
@Φ Tð Þ
@X
@Φ Tð Þ
@X
Endogenous variable
Integrated salary model 0.04 (0.10) 0.17 (0.15) 0.06 (0.11)
Hospital characteristics
Member of the council of teaching hospitals 0.035 (0.036) 0.038 (0.041) 0.011 (0.032)
For proﬁt 0.085* (0.046) 0.043 (0.049) 0.051 (0.053)
Government owned (nonfederal) 0.053 (0.033) 0.032 (0.030) 0.052* (0.027)
Member of a healthcare system 0.089*** (0.025) 0.084*** (0.022) 0.080*** (0.024)
Percent Medicare discharges 0.094 (0.095) 0.135 (0.085) 0.168* (0.095)
Percent Medicaid discharges 0.00 (0.12) 0.012 (0.11) 0.04 (0.14)
Total admissions (1000) splines
<0.43 0.70*** (0.15) 0.37** (0.16) 0.24 (0.17)
0.43–12.8 0.0113*** (0.0030) 0.0107*** (0.0031) 0.0066** (0.0026)
12.8–19 0.0115** (0.0054) 0.0059 (0.0063) 0.0003 (0.0064)
>19 0.0034*** (0.0013) 0.0001 (0.0018) 0.0008 (0.0016)
Geographic and market characteristics
Metropolitan or division CBSA 0.060*** (0.018) 0.065*** (0.025) 0.097*** (0.016)
Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index (rescaled by 1000) by HRR 0.013 (0.012) 0.0060 (0.0061) 0.001 (0.012)
Median household income in county (in $10,000) 0.0012 (0.0098) 0.0091 (0.0082) 0.0090 (0.0072)
Medicare managed care penetration in county 0.145** (0.073) 0.086 (0.078) 0.011 (0.066)
Tests
Chi-square test of instrument strength 23.77 22.82 25.00
rho 0.04 (0.20) 0.33 (0.30) 0.12 (0.23)
P value from test of rho = 0 0.84 0.32 0.62
N 3493 3493 3493
Standard errors calculated by the delta method are reported in parentheses. Estimates allow for correlation in the error terms within states.
HRR, hospital referral region.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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IT, such as easier exchange of patient data among providers in an integrated health system, may reduce the
technology’s value to hospitals that do not employ any of their physician staff. Also, provider resistance to
accompanying changes in work practices may continue to slow implementation—at least in the near term until
generational turnover in the medical workforce produces more cohorts of physicians primarily trained in health
IT-enabled environments. CPOE in particular has been noted for engendering strong resistance (Poon et al., 2004).
Some concerns on the part of providers regarding reduced productivity and new forms of error may be warranted
as the work of Koppel et al. (2005) suggests. Regardless of risks associated with this particular technology,
hospitals that employ their physicians may more easily coordinate with their medical staff to implement innovations
that require substantial organizational change.
Lower rates of adoption among nonintegrated hospitals may also indicate a lower return from the public
subsidies being given to these hospitals, thus calling into question the wisdom of subsidizing IT adoption by
such hospitals. Alternatively, health IT in nonintegrated settings may still produce some value, but such
hospitals may require greater incentives to support its adoption. Further research is needed to identify more
precisely the relative value of the technology in integrated and nonintegrated settings. Also, from a social
welfare perspective, if health IT improves quality of care (some compelling evidence for this has been produced
by Miller and Tucker, 2011b, who found lower rates of neonatal mortality attributable to EMR adoption),
hospital–physician integration may enhance its ability to do so. These beneﬁts must, however, be weighed
against possible costs to society if hospital–physician integration also confers greater bargaining power with
payers or leads to induced demand for proﬁtable but unnecessary medical services. Finally, the ﬁndings of
this study indicate that continued enforcement of the corporate practice of medicine restrictions on hospital
employment of physicians in some states inhibit hospital adoption of health IT.
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